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Abstract 
This study seeks to investigate the role of corruption in the relationship between public debt and economic growth 
in Belt & Road countries during 1996-2017 by applying the generalized method of moment (GMM). Using 
grouped and ungrouped samples; the results reveal that public debt plays a significant and negative role in 
economic growth. Corruption also plays a significant and negative role in economic growth. The interaction terms 
of public debt and corruption play a significant and negative role in economic growth. Moreover; several 
robustness checks like fixed and random effect models also confirm the results of the  GMM approach. The 
inclusion of more control variables also confirms the baseline estimation. The impact of Belt & Road initiative on 
economic growth is significantly positive. Several policy recommendations can be drawn from this study. The 
reduction of the adverse effect of public debt and improvement in economic growth can be brought by applying 
measures that curb corruption and enhance economic collaboration with other economies.      
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I. Introduction 
Financial crisis2007-2008 affects the fiscal imbalances of many economies of the world. The crisis originated with 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Almost all the globalized world feels its spillover effects. To control its effect, 
governments have taken some fiscal and monetary measure to control the effects. However, corruption and the 
shadow economy affect the remedial measures.  Most of the Belt & Road (BRI) countries are developing and 
facing rampant corruption (Olken&Pande, 2011). Therefore, the study aims to investigate the role of public debt 
in economic growth and income inequality in BRI countries by examining the intermediating role of corruption.  
Role of government debt in economic growth gave rise to controversy when the findings of the Reinhart & Rogoff 
(2010) came into light. The slower economic performance and controversy further fueled the debate when mistakes 
in their study were highlighted. The debate continues regarding this macroeconomic issue. The governments 
usually print money, impose taxation, and other essential measures to curb slower economic performance. For 
politicians and social scientists, Buchanan (1966) ask an important question-e.g., “When and who pays for public 
expenditure financed by debt issue, instead of by taxation or the printing of money?”  
The neoclassical growth theories argue that capital mobility enhances economic performance.  In their initial stages 
of developments, the countries do not have sufficient amount of resources-e.g., investment opportunities, and 
capital stock (Chowdhury, 2001).  The external debt positively contributes the economic growth so far it is used 
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for investment. Similarly, the findings of Burnside and Dollar (2000) also report that debt can enhance growth 
performance under some specific conditions. However, economic growth and investment may also be adversely 
affected by a higher volume of debt. ‘Debt overhang' theory states that whenever the volume of debt is high enough, 
then it leads to the depressing of investment by anticipating the increased cost of debt servicing (Krugman, 1988; 
Karagol, 2002). This is called the crowding-out effect of government debt because a limited amount of money left 
for investment, and it leads to adverse economic growth. 
Similarly, the shadow economy and corruption affect the level of public debt.1A vast literature shows that 
corruption is detrimental for economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001; Tanzi&Davoodi, 2002), reduce foreign 
direct investment (Wei, 2000; Abed &Davoodi, 2000); limit productivity (Lambsdorff, 2003). Corrupt countries 
tend to have larger shadow economy (Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, &Zoido-Lobaton, 2000; Johnson, 
Kaufmann, & Shleifer, 1997; Schneider, Buehn, & Montenegro, 2010), face higher inflation (Al-Marhubi,2000), 
lower expenditure on  health and education (Mauro, 1998) affect state bond ratings (Depken&Lafountain, 2006), 
and adversely affect the poor (Justesen&Bjornskov, 2014). Corruption can also has undermine the firms’ 
performances.Corruption destroys the firms andforeign bank affiliates’ financial performance (Van Vu, Tran, Van 
Nguyen, and Lim 2016; Petrou, 2014). Economic growth and innovation has been discouraged in countries with 
rampant corruption (Lau, Yang, Zhang, and Leung; 2015).  
The previous studies did not convey the clear picture of government debt & economic growth relationship.  Poirson 
et al., (2004); and Poirson et al., (2002); Cohen (1993) did not find significant evidence to support the view that 
government debt can crowd out the investment.  On the other hand, the findings of several studies report that debt 
can adversely affect investment and economic growth (Nguyen et al., 2003; Chowdhury, 2001; Elbadawi, 1999). 
Therefore, our contribution is to provide further insights into the debt and growth literature by exploring the impact 
of public debt on economic growth in a newly established economic block, i.e., Belt & Road Initiative (BRI).  
Moreover, we also provide new insight by seeing the intermediating role of corruption on economic growth. 
Furthermore, various robustness checks are applied to look more closely the specific relationship, i.e., period 
specifications, grouped & ungrouped data analysis, and static as well as dynamic panel estimation (GMM), and 
inclusion of more robust variables in our analysis.  
Similarly, previous studies provide non-conclusive findings of public debt and income inequality Claessens and 
Perrotti, 2007; De Haan and Sturm, 2017). Previous studies are based on cross-countries with IV and OLS 
approaches. The techniques estimate the parameters of interest at the mean evaluation by a conditional distribution 
of the dependent variable. We contribute the literature by examining the effect of public debt on income inequality 
using the Koenker and Bassett (1978) quantile regression (QR) technique. The QR methodology enables us to 
examine the effect at different intervals. Similarly, we contribute the existing literature by examining the influence 
of public debt on income inequality through a transmission channel of corruption.  
The paper is organized as follows. The background of the study is described in Section II.  The third section deals 
with the data and estimation methodology. Section IV reports the empirical results. Concluding remarks are given 
in Section V.  
II. Background 
The debt-growth relationship is interesting for many researcher and policymakers. Since we formulate empirical 
framework used in our study; therefore, we highlight some of the prominent contributions by the researchers. From 
a theoretical perspective, there is vast literature showing how economic growth gets influence by public debt. 
Diamond (1965) examined the influence of public debt on long-run equilibrium in growth model. The author came 
on conclusion that irrespective of financing external or internal debt, the  taxes have the same impact on 
individuals. Greiner (2012) relates a higher public debt ratio with a lower long-run growth rate. However, Greiner 
(2013) argues that when wage rigidity is assumed, the conclusion is different. Public debt does not affect long-run 
economic growth or employment, but only the stability of the economy. 
 
Public debt can affect the economic in several ways. Firstly, governments want to reduce the impact of public 
debt. Therefore, they issue more currency which creates inflations. Secondly, excess public debt may lead to 
increase the long-term sovereign yields in a nonlinear manner. High long-term return rate will crowd out private 
investment and reduce productive government investment due to higher capital costs. The situation will hamper 
the economic growth. Thirdly, public debt has a negative effect on economic growth because it crowd-out domestic 
investments by reducing personal incomes and raising the distortionary costs of taxation. Checherita Westphal and 
Rother (2012) conclude that relationship between public debt and economic growth in non-linear. They added 
 
1public power for private gain (Buehn& Schneider, 2009). 
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further that negative effect of government debt on growth stands between 70% and 80%.1The authors identified 
several transmitting channels through which public debt affect economic growth. The channels are consisting of 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP), public investment, and private saving.  
 
Moreover, some authors reach opposite conclusions. Puente-Ajovín and Sanso-Navarro (2015) find that when 
economic growth is slower, then the economic activity affects government debt through automatic stabilizers and 
the decrease of tax collection. Similarly, Chen (2014) argues that while debt is neutral for the US economy, the 
debt channels of the US economy are the stock of capital, national saving rates, and real investment. Finally, 
Sutherland and Hoeller (2012) highlight the transmission channels through which high levels of debt can hamper 
macroeconomic stability. One channel is to reduce the possibility of a government to respond efficiently to adverse 
shocks. 
 
Looking at the literature on the debt-growth relationship and debt thresholds, Reinhart, & Rogoff (2010) explore 
the possibility of a persistent relationship between high gross central government debt levels, economic growth, 
and inflation. They report the existence of a weak link between low levels of debt and growth. However, when the 
debt ratio is over 90%, the economies' growth rates are on average, one percent lower than otherwise. Based on a 
panel data of advanced and developing countries over 38 years, Woo, & Kumar (2010) reach on an important 
conclusion: an inverse relationship between the initial level of government debt and economic growth rate. 
III. Data and estimation methodology 
1- Data 
The basis concern of our study is to explore the relationship between public debt, economic growth, and income 
inequality with the transmission channel of corruption. We use annual data from 1996-2017 relating to BRI 
countries. The BRI is a newly established economic block and consist of countries from Asia, Europe, Africa, 
Oceania, and Latin America (see Appendix for list of countries). More than seventy countries are included in BRI. 
Due to data limitation, our sample restrict to only sixty countries.  
Our main variables of interest are public debt and GDP growth. The corruption indices are sourced from Kaufmann 
et al. (2013) and Transparency International (TI). We include the two kinds of corruption indices to ensure 
robustness of results. Kaufmann et al. (2013) corruption index ranges from -2.5 (totally corrupt) to 2.5 (not 
corrupt). The value of Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of TI ranges from  0 (totally corrupt) to 10 (not corrupt). 
The scales of the two indices are reversed for estimation and maintain consistency between the two indices. We 
reverse the scale for Kaufmann corruption index with 5 for totally corrupt and 0 for not corrupt country. The TI is 
rescaled with 0 stands for not corrupt and ten totally corrupt.  
Moreover, we include shadow economy as one of the controlled variables in our study. The reason for the inclusion 
of shadow economy is that corrupt countries are having large shadow economies. The shadow economies affect 
the level of economic growth and public debt. For shadow economies, we rely on the data of Schneider et al. 
(2010). Schneider et al. (2010) argue that shadow economies become large due to several elements. The elements 
consist of increasing taxation and higher regulation with lower institutional quality.  They use the Multiple 
Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) approach to estimate the shadow economy because the shadow economy 
cannot be measured directly. The data run from 1999-2007; therefore, the missing data is interpolated till 2017.  
We include foreign direct investment (FDI) as one of our control variables. A plethora of literature shows FDI and 
economic growth relationship. Several macro-based articles on both developed and developing countries indicate 
a positive effect of FDI inflows (Olofsdotter1998; Reisen and Soto 2001). However, other studies report an adverse 
effect of FDI on economic growth (Mencinger2003; Carkovic& Levine 2005; Johnson 2006; Türkcan, Duman, 
and Yetkiner2008; Herzer 2012) or an inconclusive effect (De Mello 1999).  
 
Moreover, infrastructure also plays an essential role in economic performance. We include global infrastructure 
index in this study as our control variable. The construction of the global infrastructure index is explained in 
Donaubauer et al. (2015). The index is based on transport, energy, ICT (internet and communication technologies), 
and financial indicators. The data is available from 1990–2010, the rest of it is interpolated. Furthermore, 
secondary school enrolment and inflation are used as a proxy for human capital and macroeconomic stability. 
Details of all variables along with their description statistics are given in Table 1.  
 
 
1 The authors study twelve Euro area countries from 1970 until 2010. 
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Table 1. Data source and summary statistics 
Variable Notation Obs. Mean SD Min Max Comment 
GDP growth (annual %) grow 1,652 4.41 5.12 -37.14 54.15 WDI (2018) 
Public Debt% of GDP GD 955 5.3 0.4 2.3 6.5 WDI (2018) 
Corruption Index Kaufmann et al. (ranges 
from approximately 0 (no corruption) to 5 
(high corruption) 
KCI 1,680 2.57 1.11 0.98 5 Kaufmann et al. (2013) 
Corruption Perceptions Index TI. (ranges 
from 0 (not corrupt) to 10 (totally corrupt) 
TI 1,680 2.98 1.43 0.00 8.8 
Transparency International, 
2013 
Shadow economy% of GDP shadow 1,510 3.4 0.5 0.7 4.2 Schneider et al. (2010) 
Global infrastructure index GINFRA 1,652 0.8 0.4 -2.3 1.7 Donaubaueret al. (2015) 
Total debt service (% of GNI) DS 1,064 1.5 0.8 2.3 3.6 WDI (2018) 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% 
of GDP) 
FDI 1,680 3.7 0.2 2.3 4.5 WDI (2018) 
Inflation INF 1,680 7.8 0.3 2.3 9.8 WDI (2018) 
GINI index GINI 1,056 3.56 0.21 2.79 4.17 WDI(2018) 
GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) GDPPC 1,652 8.51 1.30 5.1 11.19 WDI (2018) 
Secondary school enrolment (gross %) HC 1,653 4.89 0.28 -2.30 5.37 WDI (2018) 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) GCF 1,652 4.92 0.21 -2.30 5.44 WDI (2018) 
General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
GE 1,652 3.35 0.28 -2.30 4.49 WDI (2018) 
Urban population (% of total) URBAN 1655 1.64 0.20 1.07 1.95 WDI (2018) 
Exports plus imports divided by GDP OPEN 1,644 1.77 0.51 -0.77 2.33 WDI (2018 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross) HC 1,653 4.9 0.3 2.3 5.4 WDI (2018) 
Note: All variables have been converted into a logarithmic form for the empirical estimation except the corruption indices. 
 
Before proceeding further, we need to identify the order of integration of variables in order to avoid a possible 
problem of spurious regression. Table 3(see Appendix) reports the results of the unit root. For robustness check, 
we report four different kinds of tests’ results. All the results show that our variables are stationary at level.  
2- Model specification 
We analyze the debt-growth relationship in the neoclassical growth framework. There is always an issue of 
heterogeneity in cross-country panel analysis; therefore, convergence issue arises. Economies with higher values 
of real income tend to grow faster than the economies with a higher starting value of real per capita income (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).  However, we use government debt-to-GDP ratio. Rather than the initial per capita 
income, other aspects also can explain the convergence phenomena. 
 
Our study is designed to estimate the linearities and nonlinearities in the debt-growth relationship in the context 
of BRI countries. In this paper, we examine the impact of various indicators of debt burden on the economic growth 
of BRI countries and corruption indices as the transmission channels. Our models take the following forms; 
 =  	 +   


+   


+  +  +   … … …  !" (1) 
 
&'(' =  	 +   


+   


+  +  +   … … …  !" (2) 
 
 
Where grow is the GDP growth, Xitj is a set of control variables, DEBT is public debt, and DS is debt servicing. 
Subscripts i and t represent panel and time dimension, while η and  denote time-specific and country-specific 
effects.   
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3- Estimation methodology 
All explanatory variables used in our empirical model are not strictly exogenous. If this is the case, straightaway 
panel estimation will yield biased results. Therefore, a test for endogeneity should be applied. If the null hypothesis 
of exogeneity is rejected, then Arellano– Bover (1995)–Blundell Bond (1998) system GMM estimator will be 
employed. GMM allows for controlling the joint endogeneity of explanatory variables through the use of internal 
instruments (see Enders, 2004 and Baltagi, 2005). The tricky issue in GMM methodology is to select valid 
instruments/moments. No rule of thumb exists in instruments' selection. For this purpose, Murray (2006) discussed 
various tricks. Two diagnostic tests are there for the validity of instruments. Firstly, we have Hansen test for over-
identifying restrictions with the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Secondly, 
we have Arellano–Bond test for second-order correlation in the first differenced residuals. The advantage of using 
GMM over the other instrumental variable (IV) methods is that a G MM estimator is more efficient if 
heteroskedasticity is present. Similarly, a GMM estimator is not worse than an IV estimator if heteroskedasticity 
is not present. In this study, the lagged values of independent variables have been used as instruments. We also 
perform a robustness check by the inclusion of additional control variables in our model. 
 We apply the mentioned estimation technique in this study on aggregated and disaggregated data (by decomposing 
global sample into various groups like Asia, Europe, and Africa) for various periods (1996-2017, 2013-2017, and 
2008-2012). The intention for this disaggregation is to watch the role of corruption in growth and public debt 
relationship for BRI countries closely. Similarly, the purpose of dividing period is to see the impact of BRI 
initiative on the relationship. 
To see the impact of BRI on growth, we use fixed and random effect models by including period dummy on the 
aggregate data (global sample). For this purpose, we will divide data into two parts, i.e., 2008-2012 and 2013-
2017, by assigning 0 to the former and 1 for the later. Comparative to the random and fixed effect models that are 
not restricted, the pooled model is restricted and assumes that countries are homogeneous. When it is necessary to 
control for omitted variables that are constant over time but differ between countries, the fixed-effects model is 
desirable. Since the fixed effect considers heterogeneity and individual country effects, therefore, it gives better 
estimates than the pooled model. 
 
On the other hand, no individual country effects are assumed in the random effect model. Hausman (1978) test is 
employed to choose between fixed- and random-effect models. Hausman test specifies whether the explanatory 
variables are correlated with specific effects or not. Hausman test makes sure the selection of the model with 
consistent results. Random effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables is the central assumption in 
random effect estimation. The fixed effect model is feasible if the p-value is significant, i.e., < 5%. On the other 
hand, if it is greater than 5%, then the most appropriate model is the random-effects model. 
 
Furthermore, we employ quantile regression (QR) to examine influence of public debt on income distribution in 
BRI countries. For comparison purpose, we also employ the fixed effect model. QR estimation methodology 
enables the estimation at different intervals of condition distribution.  
IV. Empirical results 
The preliminary estimation is carried out using OLS, panel fixed effects, and the system General Method of 
Moments (GMM). Given the uncertainty and likely measurement errors in corruption, the estimation is carried 
out using both the Transparency International (TI) and Kaufmann et al. (2013) corruption indices. 
1. Baseline estimation results for different groups of countries during 1996-2017 
Table 2 reports the result of system GMM. The results in column (1)-(4) under the global sample heading show 
that the coefficients of debt and debt-square are significantly negative. The results are consistent with previous 
studies' findings, i.e., Akram, 2016; and Chen, Yao, Hu, & Lin, 2017. The coefficients of Kaufmann et al. (2013) 
corruption index as well TI index are both significant in all columns except the corruption-K that turn out to be 
insignificant in (2). Similarly, the interaction terms between debt and the corruption indices from column (1)-(4) 
are significant with correct signs. The results are consistent with findings of the previous studies, i.e.Cieślik and 
Goczek, 2018; Hongdao et al., 2018; Dutta et al., 2017; Saha and Ali, 2017; Gyimah-Brempong and de Gyimah-
Brempong, 2006; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Tanzi & Davoodi, 2002; Mo, 2001; and Mauro, 1995 . Moreover; for 
control variables, the results show that FDI is significant in column (1) and (3); however, it becomes insignificant 
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in columns (2) and (4). Similarly, the variables human capital and global infrastructure are significant in all the 
equations. The signs of the coefficients are according to the expectation. 
The sample of Asian countries’ results reveals that the coefficients of debt and debt-square in column (1) and (2) 
show are slightly insignificant and negative; however, they are significant in column (3) and (4).  The coefficients 
of KCI in column (1) and (2) are both significantly negative; similarly, the interaction term of KCI and debt is also 
significant. Moreover, the TI and its interaction term are significant, as shown in column (3) and (4). Regarding 
the control variables, the coefficient of FDI is significant from (1)-(3). However, it becomes insignificant in (4). 
The coefficient of HC is significantly positive in all the specifications. The infrastructure variable is statistically 
insignificant and positive in all the specifications. The possible explanation might be that the infrastructure quality 
is not satisfactory in Asian countries compared to the advanced countries. 
The results of European countries show that from column (1)-(4), the coefficients of debt are significant. Similarly, 
the coefficients of debt-square are significant in (1), (2), and (3); however, the coefficient is insignificant in (4). 
For European countries, similar findings are reported by Checherita-Westphal & Rother (2012)1; and Woo, & 
Kumar (2010). The coefficients of KCI, TI, and their interaction with debt are significant in all the specifications. 
Moreover, FDI is not significant in (1)-(3); however, its coefficient is significant in (4). Similarly, the coefficients 
of HC are significant in the first three specifications, but it turns out to be insignificant in the 4th specification. The 
coefficients of GINFRA are significant in all the specifications.  
The results of African countries show that from column (1)-(4), the coefficients of debt and debt-square are 
significant. The results also indicate that the debt to GDP ratio has a detrimental impact on GDP growth (because 
it may induce an increase in country risk or higher interest rates). The coefficients of KCI, TI, and their interaction 
with debt are significant in all the specifications. Moreover, the results of control variables show that FDI is 
significant in all the specifications. The results for the African sample suggest that Africa became an attractive 
destination for investors that positively contribute to its economic growth.  The coefficients of HC are not 
significant in all the equations. This runs contrary to the results of most studies, which suggest that more highly 
skilled workers are beneficial to economic growth. This might be because, in Africa, economic growth comes 
mainly from increasing development of the exploitation of natural resources. It is capital intensive and thus does 
not require more highly skilled workers.2 Similarly, the coefficients of GINFRA are significant in (1) and (3), but 
they are not significant in specifications 2 and 4. 
 
2. Estimation with more control variables during 1996-2017 
Table 3 reports the result of system GMM. The results in column (1)-(4) under the global sample heading show 
that the coefficients of debt and debt-square are significantly negative.  The coefficients of Kaufmann et al. (2013) 
corruption index as well TI index are both significant in all the specifications. Similarly, the interaction terms 
between debt and the corruption indices from column (1)-(4) are significant with correct signs. Moreover; for 
control variables, the results show that the coefficients of gross capital formation (GCF) are insignificantly 
negative in all the specifications. However, the coefficients of debt servicing (DS) are significantly negative in all 
the specifications. Moreover, the coefficients of inflation are not significant in any of the specifications.  
The sample of Asian countries’ results reveals that the coefficients of debt and debt-square are significantly 
negative. The coefficients of corruption indices and their interaction terms are significantly negative.  Regarding 
the control variables, the coefficients of gross capital formation (GCF) are slightly insignificant in all the 
specifications.  The coefficients of debt servicing (DS) and inflation (INF) are significantly negative in all the 
specifications. The result for Europe sample reveals that the coefficients of debt and debt-square are significantly 
negative. The coefficients of corruption indices and their interaction terms are significantly negative. Regarding 
the control variables, the coefficients of gross capital formation (GCF) are significant in all the specifications.  The 
coefficients of debt servicing (DS) significantly negative in all the specifications; however, the coefficients are of 
inflation (INF) is negatively insignificant in all the specifications. 
 
 
 
1. Regarding the European countries; they find a non-linear impact of debt on growth with a turning point, beyond which the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio has a deleterious impact on long-term growth, at about 90-100% of GDP. 
2Kummer-Noormamode (2014) 
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Table 2. Growth equation results- system GMM 
 Full sample Asia Europe Africa 
  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Lagged dependent, linear & Non-linear terms of public debt 
Laged 
dep. 
0.84*** 
(0.02) 
0.84*** 
(0.04) 
0.87*** 
(0.02) 
0.87*** 
(0.03) 
0.8*** 
(0.1) 
0.79*** 
(0.24) 
0.84*** 
(0.12) 
0.85*** 
(0.08) 
0.93 
(0.78) 
0.79 
(0.66) 
0.93*** 
(0.04) 
0.462** 
(0.222) 
0.74 
(0.6) 
0.30 
(0.25) 
0.99** 
(0.37) 
1.0** 
(0.4) 
GD -0.01* 
(0.18) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.01* 
(0.00) 
-0.10* 
(0.06) 
-0.18 
(0.12) 
-4.65 
(3.63) 
-0.02* 
(0.011) 
-0.89* 
(0.51) 
-0.22** 
(0.11) 
-0.12** 
(0.06) 
-0.23** 
(0.10) 
-1.203** 
(0.578) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.5** 
(0.1) 
-0.08** 
(0.04) 
-0.2** 
(0.1) 
GD-sqrd -0.01* 
(0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
-0.01** 
(0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(-0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.00) 
-0.1* 
(0.0) 
-0.1* 
(0.03) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.02* 
(0.009) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.2* 
(0.1) 
-0.1*** 
(0.00) 
-0.1* 
(0) 
Control variables 
FDI 0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.01* 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.15* 
(0.09) 
1.56* 
(0.90) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
0.143 
(0.15) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.44 
(0.26) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.267*** 
(0.155) 
3.41** 
(1.64) 
0.2** 
(0.1) 
0.21** 
(0.1) 
0.21** 
(0.1) 
HC 0.46*** 
(0.05) 
0.46*** 
(0.09) 
0.39*** 
(0.05) 
0.38*** 
(0.07) 
0.41** 
(0.20) 
0.48* 
(0.27) 
0.39* 
(0.22) 
0.38** 
(0.18) 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
2.72** 
(1.30) 
0.15* 
(0.09) 
0.993 
(0.662) 
0.24 
(0.22) 
0.93 
(0.62) 
 0.7 
(0.7) 
0.93 
(0.6) 
GINFRA 0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.1*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.39** 
(0.18) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.375** 
(0.18) 
0.38*** 
(0.07) 
0.25 
(0.2) 
 0.34** 
(0.2) 
0.49 
(0.29) 
Corruption indices and their interaction with public debt 
KCI -0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
    -0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.16* 
(0.09) 
    -0.01** 
(0.00) 
-1.02** 
(0.36) 
  -0.82*** 
(0.29) 
-0.1*** 
(0.0) 
  
 
KCI*GD   -0.02* 
(0.01) 
     -5.06* 
(2.92) 
     -0.15* 
(0.08) 
 
   -0.1* 
(0.1) 
  
  
TI     -0.17* 
(0.10) 
-0.14* 
(0.08) 
  -2.5* 
(1.45) 
-0.52* 
(0.30) 
  -0.13* 
(0.07) 
-1.128* 
(0.655) 
  -0.7* 
(0.44) 
-0.76** 
(0.44) 
TI *GD       -0.17* 
(0.10) 
   -1.15* 
(0.66) 
   -1.467*** 
(0.518) 
   -0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Obs. 660 660 660 660 300 300 300 300 160 176 160 160 120 120 120 160 
Hansen 
(p-vale) 
0.48 0.34 0.28 0.23 0.31 0.15 0.19 0.47 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.014 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.10 
AR(-2) 0.58 0.65 0.29 0.32 0.42 0.65 0.68 0.83 0.22 0.15 0.25 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.49 0.75 
Note: *, **, and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The coefficient of constant is ignored. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. GMM results are reported for two-step GMM estimator 
The sample of African countries’ results reveals that the coefficients of debt and debt-square are significantly 
negative. The results imply that the debt to GDP ratio has a significant and detrimental impact on GDP growth 
(because it may induce an increase in country risk or higher interest rates). Similarly, the coefficients of KCI 
significantly negative in (1) but its coefficient become insignificant in (3); however, its interaction with debt turn 
out to be significantly negative. The coefficient of TI is significantly negative in the specification (3), but it 
becomes insignificant in (4); however, its interaction with TI becomes significantly negative. Regarding the control 
variables, the coefficients of gross capital formation (GCF) are significant in all the specifications.  The coefficients 
of debt servicing (DS) significantly negative in all the specifications. The coefficient of inflation is significantly 
different from zero and negative, which confirms that a stable macroeconomic environment attracts investors and 
is favorable for economic growth in Africa.  
3. Estimation with BRI dummy 
To see the impact of Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) effect on the selected 60 countries closely, we apply fixed and 
random estimation methodology by incorporating a dummy variable. We assign “0” for 2008-2009 and “1” for 
2013-2017 because in the year 2013 most of the countries joined BRI. Our global sample reduced to 35 countries 
due to non-availability of data and late joining of some countries. For robustness checking, we incorporate 
additional control variables. 
Table 4 reports the results of the fixed-effect model. Total of 12 specifications is estimated. The linear and non-
linear terms of public debt are significantly positive in all the specifications. Similarly, the KCI and TI are 
significantly negative in all the specifications. The coefficients of the shadow economy and its interaction with 
public debt are significantly negative in all the specifications. It shows that the size of the shadow economy and 
economic growth are negatively correlated. Our variable of interest, i.e., the BRI dummy, is significant and has a 
positive impact on economic growth. The control variables show mix results, i.e., FDI and GINFRA are 
significantly positive, but HC becomes insignificant.  Similarly, gross capital formation is significantly positive in 
all the equations, which shows that investment plays a positive role in economic growth. Similarly, the coefficients 
of debt servicing are significantly negative, but inflation becomes insignificant in all the specification though its 
coefficients are negative. 
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Table 3. Growth equation results- system GMM 
 Full sample Asia Europe Africa 
  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Lagged dependent, linear & Non-linear terms of public debt 
Laged 
dep. 
-0.199** 
(0.095) 
0.2* 
(0.05) 
0.199** 
(0.096) 
0.2** 
(0.1) 
-0.23** 
(0.11) 
-0.22 
(0.04) 
-0.34** 
(0.16) 
0.32** 
(0.15) 
0.79 
(0.73) 
1.14 
(0.29) 
0.35 
(0.33) 
0.42 
(0.39) 
0.33 
(0.3) 
0.94 
(0.05) 
0.9 
(0.84) 
1.08** 
(0.52) 
GD -0.031** 
(0.015) 
-0.069** 
(0.033) 
-0.032** 
(0.015) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.2** 
(0.1) 
-0.32** 
(0.15) 
-1.08** 
(0.52) 
-3.48** 
(1.67) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
-0.11** 
(0.05) 
-0.14** 
(0.07) 
-1.73** 
(0.83) 
-0.01** 
(0.01) 
-4.94** 
(2.38) 
-0.11** 
(0.05) 
-5.11** 
(2.45) 
GD-sqrd -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.21** 
(0.08) 
-0.18** 
(0.06) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.02) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01*** 
(0) 
-0.82*** 
(0.29) 
Control variables 
GCF 0.544 
(0.329) 
0.546 
(0.331) 
0.549 
(0.333) 
0.55 
(0.33) 
1.05 
(0.64) 
1.05 
(0.64) 
2.42 
(1.47) 
2.5 
(1.52) 
0.3** 
(0.14) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
5.06 
(3.05) 
8.2 
(4.94) 
6.75 
(4.07) 
24.45 
(14.73) 
DS -0.023** 
(0.011) 
-0.023** 
(0.011) 
-0.023** 
(0.011) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.01** 
(0) 
-0.01** 
(0) 
-0.01** 
(0.01) 
-0.07** 
(0) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.01** 
(0) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.49** 
(0.24) 
0.77** 
(0.37) 
0.29** 
(0.14) 
-3.3** 
(1.59) 
INF -0.437 
(0.29) 
-0.441 
(0.292) 
-0.441 
(0.292) 
-0.44 
(0.29) 
-1.15 
(0.76) 
-1.22 
(0.81) 
-5.04 
(3.34) 
-10.85 
(7.19) 
-0.32 
(0.21) 
-0.83 
(0.55) 
-0.48 
(0.32) 
-0.6 
(0.4) 
-12.99* 
(7.33) 
-6.18* 
(3.47) 
-12.5* 
(6.95) 
-14.9* 
(8.41) 
Corruption indices and their interaction with public debt 
KCI -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
  
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.07** 
(0.02) 
  -0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
  0.17*** 
(0.06) 
-2.5 
(3.01) 
  
KCI*GD 
 
0.018*** 
(0.009) 
  
 -0.64** 
(0.31) 
    -0.05** 
(0.02) 
    1.36** 
(0.65) 
  
TI 
  
-0.118** 
(0.057) 
-0.13** 
(0.06) 
  -8.37** 
(4.02) 
-9.53** 
(4.58) 
  -0.16*** 
(0.06) 
-0.55*** 
(0.19) 
  8.6*** 
(3.04) 
-17.41 
(20.95) 
TI *GD 
   
0.01*** 
(0) 
   -4.05** 
(1.43) 
   -2.67** 
(1.29) 
   -3.25** 
(1.56) 
obs.  500  500  500  500  220  220  220  220  132  132  132  132  120  120  120  120 
Hansen 
(p-vale) 
0.13 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.17 0.30 0.22 0.34 0.21 0.15 0.24 0.40 0.12 0.09 0.29 0.10 
AR(-2) 0.22 0.31 0.26 0.41 0.24 45 32 46 0.35 0.25 0.33 0.54 0.53 0.18 0.43 0.33 
Note: *, **, and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The coefficient of constant is ignored. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. GMM results are reported for two-step GMM estimator 
 
4. Estimation of Gini by quantile regression approach 
Table 5 and Table 6 present results for each measure of public debt and corruption for the full sample of countries. 
Column (1) shows the fixed effect estimation. From columns (2) to (6), we report results for the 10, 25, 50, 75, 
and 90 percent quantile. The equality test is shown in column (7).1 Robust standard errors for the fixed effects 
estimates and the QR results from the 1000 bootstrapping repetitions are reported to obtain robust 
heteroskedasticity estimates.  The results show that all the measures of public debt, the square of public debt, and 
debt servicing have a statistically insignificant. The results imply that public debt has no effect on income 
distribution. These findings are following Akram (2016); Prechel(1985). The transmission channels that can affect 
the income distribution are complicated (Blejer and Guerrero 1990). The impacts of the composition of aggregate 
policy packages may differ from individual variables. The impact of corruption on inequality is significantly 
positive—i.e.,  high and rising corruption increase income inequality and poverty by reducing the formation of 
human capital, the progressively of tax system, the effectiveness of social spending, by perpetuating unequal 
distribution of assets owned, and reducing economic growth. The findings are consistent with Gupta (1998). The 
coefficients’ signs of public debt in fixed effect and QR are coherent. Lastly, the equality test suggests that null 
hypothesis may be rejected in favor of alternative hypothesis that QR coefficients are not equal.  
The results in Table 5 suggests that trade openness promotes inequality. The findings are consistent with Altunbaş 
& Thornton (2019); Akram (2016); Lundberg and Lyn (1999). Economic openness through capital inflows, FDI, 
and trade are important elements for economic growth, but these factors enhance the level of inequalities. Our 
finding support the view that globalization increase income inequalities. Similarly, the human capital deteriorates 
due to the increased corruption, which leads to an increase in income inequality. The findings are consistent with 
Gupta (1998).Per capita GDP appears to have a significant negative impact on income distribution. Altunbaş& 
Thornton (2019); Akram (2016); Page (2006); and Dollar &Kraay(2003) also support that the income inequality 
can be reduced by enhancing per capita GDP and is helpful for the poor. The inequalities can be reduced with an 
increase in per capita GDP. Higher economic growth can also help in increasing public investments and revenues, 
thereby, brings poor to economic mainstream.  
 
 
 
1The equality test is conducted for the purpose that the slope coefficients of the regression quantile are all the same. 
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Table 4. Growth equation results- fixed & random effect 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Linear & Non-linear terms of public debt 
GD -0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.03** 
(0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
-0.07** 
(0.04) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.11** 
(0.05) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
GD-sqrd -0.02*** 
(0) 
-0.05** 
(0.03) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.03) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.01** 
(0.00) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.03** 
(0.02) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
Control variables 
FDI 0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
  
    
HC 0.14 
(0.08) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
0.14 
(0.09) 
0.142 
(0.08) 
0.15 
(0.09) 
0.14 
(0.09) 
  
    
GINFRA 0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.09** 
(0.05) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.1** 
(0.05) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
  
    
Inclusion of more control variables 
GCF 
    
  0.3*** 
(0.11) 
0.27*** 
(0.09) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
0.32*** 
(0.11) 
0.25*** 
(0.09) 
0.23*** 
(0.08) 
DS 
    
  -0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.03** 
(0.02) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
INF 
    
  -0.37 
(0.26) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.15 
(0.1) 
-0.4 
(0.28) 
-0.28 
(0.19) 
-0.62 
(0.42) 
Corruption indices, shadow economy, and their interaction with public debt 
KCI -0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
 
    -0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
    
KCI*GD 
 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
 
     -0.02*** 
(0.01) 
    
TI 
  
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.08* 
(0.05) 
    -0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.1** 
(0.05) 
  
TI *GD 
   
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
     -0.04** 
(0.02) 
  
Shadow 
    
-0.24** 
(0.12) 
-0.22** 
(0.11) 
    -0.18** 
(0.09) 
-0.19** 
(0.09) 
Shadow*GD 
    
 -1.97** 
(0.69) 
     -1.02 
(0.65) 
Inclusion of BRI dummy 
DD 0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
obs. 332 332 332 332 332 332 250 250 250 250 250 250 
Hausman 
(p-vale) 
0.002 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.103 0.1048 0.103 0.104 0.0440 0.064 
Note: *, **, and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The coefficient of constant is ignored. Robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis 
 
Of the other explanatory variables in Table 6; urbanization has a positive and significant impact on income 
distribution. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that excessive urbanization leads to worsen the workers 
health and increase unemployment (Oyvat, 2016; Harris-Todaro (1970). The situation leads to reduce the 
productivity and income of the poor. Similarly, government expenditure has also a significant positive impact on 
income inequality, which is consistent with the findings of Altunbaş & Thornton (2019). Government expenditure 
may be a poor proxy for social spending. The government expenditures aim to reduce income inequalities, but it 
may be possible that most spending on transfers is captured by the middle class (Milanovic, 1994; Davoodi et al., 
2003). The argument is also consistent with the quantile results. The coefficients inflation is not statistically 
significant.  
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Table 5.  Public debt and income inequality: dependent variable Gini coefficient. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
  
FE Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Eq. 
test 
FE Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Eq. 
test 
Linear & Non-linear terms of public debt 
GD -0.1 
(0.1) 
-0.2 
(0.2) 
-0.16 
(0.14) 
-0.23 
(0.19) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.53 
(0.45) 
0.51 
(0.72) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.14 
(0.12) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
1.02 
(0.39) 
GD-
sqrd 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
1.83 
(0.12) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.75 
(0.56) 
Inclusion of control variables 
OPEN 0.01* 
(0) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.11** 
(0.04) 
0.29** 
(0.11) 
0.16** 
(0.06) 
1.13 
(0.34) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.01** 
(0) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.1 
(0.04) 
0.24* 
(0.1) 
0.14 
(0.05) 
4.67 
(0.001) 
HC -0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.12* 
(0.07) 
-0.1* 
(0.06) 
-0.18* 
(0.10) 
-0.17* 
(0.09) 
-0.21* 
(0.11) 
1.78 
(0.13) 
-0.09* 
(0.06) 
-0.05* 
(0.03) 
-0.06* 
(0.03) 
-0.16* 
(0.09) 
-0.13* 
(0.07) 
-0.23* 
(0.12) 
1.32 
(0.263) 
GDPPC -0.01* 
(0) 
-0.13* 
(0.06) 
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.1** 
(0.04) 
-0.01** 
(0.01) 
-0.01** 
(0) 
2.02 
(0.09) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
-0.1** 
(0.04) 
-0.11* 
(0.05) 
-0.1** 
(0.04) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.2 
(0.05) 
2.10 
(0.081) 
Corruption indices and their interaction with public debt 
KCI 0.18* 
(0.1) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.1** 
(0.05) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.1** 
(0.05) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.21 
(0.93) 
       
KCI*
GD 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.49* 
(0.27) 
1.39 
(0.23) 
       
TI  
  
    0.2* 
(0.11) 
0.01** 
(0) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.38* 
(0.19) 
0.18 
(0.09) 
0.56*** 
(0.27) 
0.26 
(0.90) 
TI * 
GD 
 
  
    0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.01** 
(0) 
0.01** 
(0) 
1.35 
(0.21) 
obs. 639 639 639 639 639 639  639 639 639 639 639 639  
R2 0.037 0.178 0.118 0.084 0.045 0.067  0.058 0.162 0.108 0.0872 0.0368 0.0598  
Note: *, **, and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The coefficient of constant is ignored. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
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Table 6.  Public debt and income inequality: dependent variable Gini coefficient. (more control variables) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
  
Fixed 
Effect 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Eq. 
test 
Fixed 
Effect 
Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Eq. test 
Linear & Non-linear terms of public debt 
GD -0.14   
(0.13) 
-0.36 
(0.29) 
-0.43 
(0.42) 
-0.37 
(0.34) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.2 
(0.2) 
3.37 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.17 
(0.15) 
-0.24 
(0.21) 
-0.18 
(0.17) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
1.13 
(0.37) 
GD-sqrd -0.02  
 (0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
0.76 
(0.55) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.89 
(0.60) 
Inclusion of more control variables 
URBAN 0.34* 
(0.19) 
0.2* 
(0.11) 
0.16* 
(0.09) 
0.35* 
(0.2) 
1.37* 
(0.77) 
1.65* 
(0.93) 
1.13 
(0.34) 
0.32* 
(0.18) 
0.42* 
(0.24) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.34* 
(0.19) 
-0.89* 
(0.5) 
1.59* 
(0.89) 
4.76 
(0.002) 
DS -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
1.06 
(0.36) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
1.44 
(0.30) 
INF 0.62 
(0.55) 
1.57 
(1.08) 
1.96 
(1.32) 
2.57 
(1.75) 
2.61 
(2.21) 
3.83 
(2.77) 
1.54 
(0.17) 
1.66 
(1.2) 
2.18 
(1.58) 
1.07 
(0.77) 
1.96 
(1.42) 
2.19 
(1.59) 
4.76 
(3.67) 
2.12 
(0.09) 
GE 0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.34* 
(0.19) 
0.21* 
(0.12) 
0.23 
(0.20) 
0.17 
(0.15) 
0.38* 
(0.21) 
3.38 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.18* 
(0.1) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.15* 
(0.08) 
0.33* 
(0.19) 
0.55* 
(0.31) 
1.54 
(0.17) 
Corruption indices and their interaction with public debt 
KCI 0.17** 
(0.08) 
0.4** 
(0.19) 
0.31** 
(0.15) 
0.23** 
(0.11) 
0.17** 
(0.08) 
0.32** 
(0.15) 
2.28 
(0.06) 
       
KCI*GD 0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.12** 
(0.06) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
5.21 
(0.00) 
       
TI  
  
    -0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.95** 
(0.46) 
0.7** 
(0.33) 
0.32** 
(0.15) 
0.61** 
(0.29) 
2.27 
(0.05) 
TI *GD  
  
    -0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.01** 
(0) 
0.01** 
(0) 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.01** 
(0) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
1.46 
(0.23) 
obs. 529 529 529 529 529 529  0.0405 529 529 529 529 529  
R2 0.0597 0.2772 0.1568 0.0627 0.0819 0.2612  0.0405 0.201 0.085 0.048 0.0556 0.231  
Note: *, **, and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The coefficient of constant is ignored. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
V. Conclusions and policy implications 
High debt to GDP means the collapse of economic growth and increase income inequality. The impact of public 
debt on growth is so much dangerous than unemployment even in time of recession, and it leads to policies like 
austerity. Therefore, our study aims to analyze the role of public debt in economic growth and income inequality 
in the presence of corruption in Belt & Road (BRI) countries. The findings of the study show that public debt has 
a negative effect on per capita GDP growth for both grouped and ungrouped data. Similarly, the impact of 
corruption and its interaction with public debt is negative for economic growth. Moreover, we conclude that the 
addition of more control variables does not affect the debt and growth relationship.   
Furthermore, we conclude that the Belt & Road initiative plays a positive role in enhancing economic performance 
for the member countries. Similarly, we conclude that corruption plays a positive role in income inequality. The 
interaction of corruption with public debt also strengthens the view that due to rampant corruption and excessive 
public debt in the BRI countries more widened the gap between rich and poor.  
Another important conclusion is that debt servicing affect economic growth negatively. However, FDI, human 
capital, infrastructure, and gross capital formation have a favorable effect on economic growth. We find evidence 
of an unfavorable effect of government expenditure, trade openness, and urbanization on income inequality. 
However, we find that per capita GDP and human capital favorably affect income distribution.  
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Appendix 
Table 7. Unit root results 
Variables LLC   IPS   ADF    PP   
  Intercept 
trend& 
intercept Intercept 
trend& 
intercept Intercept 
trend& 
intercept Intercept 
trend& 
intercept 
Level                 
GDP growth -10.08*** -11.52*** -9.96*** -8.06*** 316.91*** 274.11*** 482.87*** 413.73*** 
GINI -0.10 -1.57* -0.20 -0.528 122.48** 115.57** 132.67*** 245.40*** 
Public debt 58.45 5.23 26.55 3.83 125.9*** 109.5*** 110.30*** 153.7*** 
Kaufman 
corruption 
-18.01*** -15.95*** -14.26*** -9.39*** 562*** 327.6*** 2689.91*** 2509.6*** 
TI corruption -6.55*** -6.60*** -4.70*** -6.30*** 398.1*** 386.5*** 581.54*** 746.4*** 
Shadow -80.23*** -10.30*** -56.37*** -23.21*** 3525.3*** 879.9*** 11898.4*** 11355.8*** 
Debt servicing -1.52* 1.57 -1.13 0.59 91.7* 79.16 113.85*** 96.70* 
FDI -2.12** -2.09** -5.23*** -2.62*** 215.1*** 178.2*** 358.51*** 323.91*** 
GINFRA -9.31*** -7.91*** -6.18*** -5.03*** 223.9*** 203.4*** 263.03*** 211.36*** 
HC -3.34*** 2.20 1.26773 -0.83 136.63 196.7*** 643.33*** 493.3*** 
INF -72.82*** -148.30*** -30.41*** -33.37*** 611.6*** 533.8*** 531.88*** 440.9*** 
URBAN  -11.26*** 8.15 3.99 212.75*** 384.22*** 238.5*** 917.8*** 238.5*** 
GCF -4.10*** -1.72** -3.06*** -0.030 171.28*** 119.48 192.5*** 137.2* 
GDPPC -2.63*** 2.54 2.98 4.50 125.33 92.57 128.04 109.47 
GE -6.70*** -3.40*** -3.67*** -0.31 182.09*** 129.36 189.77*** 162.41*** 
OPEN 
-5.42*** -4.47*** -3.14*** 158.7*** 158.8*** 135.6** 137.9** 
135.64**  
1st difference                 
GDP growth -25.91*** -21.29*** -27.53*** -22.83*** 855.47*** 628.89*** 4461.18*** 3682.64*** 
GINI -19.10*** -18.54*** -19.90*** -17.23*** 506.98*** 413.77*** 863.21*** 859.87*** 
Public debt -2.03** -6.60*** -7.15*** -8.53*** 232.52*** 251.42*** 259.65*** 275.69*** 
Kaufman 
corruption 
-16.09*** -15.80*** -14.58*** -11.52*** 317.12*** 264.76*** 1024.15*** 646.082*** 
TI corruption -5.68*** -4.25*** -28.44*** -28.40*** 1355.1*** 625.95*** 2075.7*** 2643.7*** 
Shadow -14.96*** -15.36*** -13.03*** -4.15*** 650.18*** 253.83*** 4807.91*** 4179.61*** 
Debt servicing -8.50*** -6.37*** -11.65*** -8.46*** 279.24*** 204.88*** 874.31*** 828.06*** 
FDI -13.03*** -8.10*** -17.79*** -12.84*** 546.71*** 389.20*** 1890.64*** 1683*** 
GINFRA -21.86*** -18.28*** -21.90*** -18.81*** 655.73*** 525.81*** 1421.16*** 1422.4*** 
HC -0.55 -77.8*** -10.11*** -35.10*** 461.61*** 246.38*** 899.53*** 603.95*** 
INF -119.9*** -94.17*** -40.24*** -34.06*** 1013.96*** 592.46*** 2788.92*** 2589.93*** 
URBAN  -6.9*** 1.07 -9.66*** 221.78*** 451.49*** 201.30*** 336.03*** 201.3*** 
GCF -23.88*** -20.89*** -21.92*** -17.745*** 634.17*** 476.64*** 755.15*** 630.94*** 
GDPPC -19.52*** -19.46*** -18.56*** -16.26*** 550.60*** 455.72*** 1071.2*** 1029.36*** 
GE -25.83*** -23.8*** -23.45*** -19.91*** 683.18*** 534.18*** 1007.27*** 956.60*** 
OPEN 
-14.3*** -7.11*** -13.56*** 328.98*** 389.08*** 583.96*** 684.48*** 583.9*** 
Note: *, **, and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
  
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.11, No.33, 2019 
 
157 
Table 8. List of BRI countries  
S. No Country S. No Country S. No Country 
1 Albania 21 Jordan 41 Qatar 
2 Armenia 22 Kazakhstan 42 Romania 
3 Austria 23 Kuwait 43 Russian Federation 
4 Azerbaijan 24 Latvia 44 Saudi Arabia 
5 Bahrain 25 Lebanon 45 Senegal 
6 Bangladesh 26 Libya 46 Serbia 
7 Belarus 27 Lithuania 47 Singapore 
8 Bolivia 28 Madagascar 48 Slovak Republic 
9 Bulgaria 29 Malaysia 49 Slovenia 
10 China 30 Moldova 50 South Africa 
11 Croatia 31 Mongolia 51 Sri Lanka 
12 Czech Republic 32 Morocco 52 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
13 Egypt, Arab Rep. 33 Myanmar 53 Thailand 
14 Estonia 34 New Zealand 54 Trinidad and Tobago 
15 Ethiopia 35 Oman 55 Tunisia 
16 Hungary 36 Pakistan 56 Turkey 
17 India 37 Panama 57 Ukraine 
18 Iran, Islamic Rep. 38 Papua New Guinea 58 
United Arab 
Emirates 
19 Iraq 39 Philippines 59 Vietnam 
20 Israel 40 Poland 60 Yemen, Rep. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
